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Abstract
Syntactic logics do not suffer from the problems of logical omniscience but are often thought to lack
interesting properties relating to epistemic notions. By focusing on the case of rule-based agents, I develop
a framework for modelling resource-bounded agents and show that the resulting models have a number
of interesting properties.
1 Introduction
Logical omniscience is a well-documented problem for epistemic logics based on a possible worlds seman-
tics (first presented in Hintikka’s seminal Knowledge and Belief [21]). In this paper, I concentrate on the
concept of belief, as believing φ is a necessary condition on knowing φ. Belief is defined as truth in all
epistemically accessible worlds and as a consequence, belief is closed under consequence and agents auto-
matically believe all valid sentences. This is clearly inadmissible as a general analysis of belief.1 Several
authors take the view that, in a number of situations, logical omniscience is unproblematic, “in particular
for interpretations of knowledge that are often appropriate for analyzing distributed systems . . . and certain
AI systems.” However, “it is certainly not appropriate to the extent that we want to model resource-bounded
agents” [16, p. 41]. I will therefore take as my starting point the requirement that the beliefs of resource-
bounded agents be modelled accurately.
To avoid the problem of logical omniscience, a syntactic approach is required: that is, one which takes
the truth-conditions of belief ascriptions to be given, at least in part, in terms of sentences.2 Contrary to
the impression one receives from the logical literature, syntactic accounts of belief receive support from
the current philosophical literature.3 An objection is that syntactic epistemic logics merely give us “ways
of representing knowledge [and belief] rather than modelling knowledge [and belief]”. If so, the thought
runs, “[o]ne gains very little intuition about knowledge [or belief] from studying syntactic structures” [15,
p. 320]. The syntactic approach “lacks the elegance and intuitive appeal of the semantic [possible worlds]
approach” [14, p. 40]. My aim in this paper is therefore to present an elegant and intuitively appealing
syntactic logic of belief which allows us to accurately model resource-bounded reasoners.
The key idea is to model inference as a nondeterministic step-by-step process. Each time an inference
rule is applied and a new belief derived, the agent moves into a new belief state. This is a very fine-grained
notion of belief change. It allows models to be built in which perfectly rational reasoning is possible, in the
sense that the agent’s logical abilities need not be depleted in any way, but in which logical omniscience
never arises. This framework models agents that, as [22] has it, are neither logically omniscient nor logi-
cally ignorant. The lesson to be taken is that, in order to model real AI agents without making unrealistic
assumptions about their resource bounds, an epistemic logic must be able to represent an agent’s reasoning
at the level of individual inferences (the title of the paper is intended to reinforce this point). My strategy in
this paper is to investigate step-by-step inference in a simplified setting. The only inferential action that will
be modelled here is the act of deriving new beliefs from old using (a generalised version of) modus ponens.
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1See [34, 35, 24] for discussions of logical omniscience and related problems.
2Many authors seem to dispute this claim, especially [27, 14, 16, 15]. However, none of the approaches presented there genuinely
solve the problem. See [24]. The approach based on awareness given in [14] unwittingly concedes the point (see [24].
3See Perry [30, 31] and Corazza [11, 10] for accounts of belief in terms of an accepted sentence. Further support comes from
accepting the language of thought hypothesis: see Fodor [17, 18].
Actions such as making assumptions or instantiating axiom schema are not modelled here (but see [24] in
which such actions are modelled in the current framework).
I take as a working example a prominent case from the AI literature: the case of rule-based agents.
These agents consist of a program—a set of condition-action rules—and a rule interpreter. Rule-based
agents have been more or less ignored by the literature on epistemic logic4 but play an important roˆle in
other areas of AI. There are several rule-based agent architectures available, e.g. SOAR [26] and SIM-
AGENT [33] which allow a great degree of abstraction in specifying behaviour. Rule-based programming
extensions are also increasingly being offered as add-ons to existing, lower-level, agent toolkits, e.g., JADE
[7] and FIPA-OS [32]. Rule-based behaviour is also playing an important roˆle in analysing domains such
as business. Business rules (statements that define or constrain an aspect of a business [9], e.g. every visitor
of the conference gets a 20 per cent discount on the first product purchase) are being used by companies
to analyse the behaviour and improve the efficiency of their business. As the business rules community
puts it, “business rules are the very essence of a business. They define the terms and state the core business
policies. They control or influence business behaviour. They state what is possible and desirable in running
a business—and what is not” [9].
In general, a rule-based agent’s program will contain condition-action rules of the form
P1, . . . , Pn ⇒ Q1, . . . , Qm
Pi are the conditions, Qi the resulting actions, and each Pi, Qi may contain unbound variables or possibly
even logical connectives.5 Here, I treat both rules in the agent’s program and literals held in its working
memory as beliefs (the working memory does not play a significant roˆle in the formalism). In the modal
systems discussed below, an agent’s rules are represented in the states of those models. An equivalent
formulation could be given by encoding rules as conditions on the arcs between states. Intuitively, it makes
sense to encode inference rules as conditions on arcs and beliefs as the sentences supported by states (the
question is whether to treat the rules that appear in the agent’s program as inference rules). On the alternative
formulation, each rule is treated as an inference rule in its own right whereas on the account presented here,
rules are formulae and the agent reasons using a generalised form of modus ponens:
λ1, . . . , λn, (λ1, . . . , λn ⇒ λ)
λ
In this way, agents are modelled as having many beliefs and only the one rule of inference.
I focus on an agent’s reasoning process by assuming that the agent has an initial stock of beliefs (which
might be observations) that are neither revised nor added to, other than by firing rules and adding their
consequents as new beliefs. I make three further simplifying restrictions: (i) to rules which produce a single
action; (ii) to propositional rules and (iii) to rules which contain no disjunctions (thus, on agents who have
no disjunctive beliefs). The first two are inessential;6 (iii) is a restriction on the expressiveness of the logic
presented here, but is by no means a limitation of the general framework.7
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I present syntax and semantics for a
logic which models a single rule-based agent and then, in section 3, discuss the properties of such models.
In section 4, I consider an agent with a fixed program and, in section 5, present an axiomatization and
complexity analysis of the resulting logic. Related and future work is discussed in sections 6 and 7.
2 Modelling Rule-Based Agents
We fix a denumerable set of propositions P = {p1, p2 . . .}. A literal is either a proposition or its negation;
literals are written λ1, λ2 . . .. Rules are of the form λ1, . . . , λn ⇒ λ and in general rules are denoted
ρ, ρ1, ρ2, . . .. Since it is often useful to know which belief a rule adds when fired, we use the abbreviation
4A notable exception is [25]; see section 6.
5For example, in the ‘definition’ rule person(x) ⇒ man(x) ∨ woman(x).
6Because negation may only appear before a predicate—the agent does not believe the negation of any rule—a program in which
rules contain unbound variables can be modelled using a denumerable set of propositions, so long as both the set of predicates and
the set of constants is denumerable (in any practical case, both will be finite). Using a propositional logic allows us to use a far more
readable notation without limiting the underlying logic—all results given below also hold for the predicate case. A logic that deals
with predicate-style rules is considered in [4].
7Disjunction is ignored here merely to reduce the complexity of the presentation. See [24] for the extended framework, including
disjunctions.
cn(ρ) for λ, given that ρ = (λ1, . . . , λn ⇒ λ). The agent’s internal language LP over P contains only
rules and literals; no other formulae are considered well-formed. Since P will be fixed throughout, the
superscript may be informally dropped. Arbitrary formulae of L are denoted α, α1, . . ..
The modal languageMLP , which is used to reason about the agent’s beliefs, is built from formulae of
LP (again the superscript may informally be dropped). ML contains the usual propositional connectives
¬,∧,∨,→, the ‘3’ modality and a belief operator B. Given a literal λ and a rule ρ, ‘Bλ’ and ‘Bρ’ are
primitive wffs of ML, and all primitive wffs are formed in this way. If φ1 and φ2 are both ML wffs, the
complex wffs of ML are then given by
¬φ1 | φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1 ∨ φ2 | φ1 → φ2 | 3φ1
The dual modality ‘2’ is introduced by definition: 2φ df= ¬3¬φ. Note that the primitive formulae of ML
are all of the form ‘Bα’, where ‘α’ is a L-formula, hence the problem of substitution within belief contexts
does not arise in logics based on ML.
Models are graphs of states, with each arc representing a change in an agent’s belief state. Although
time is not explicitly represented in these models, each arc is thought of as a transition from an agent’s belief
state at one time to a (possible) belief state at a future moment in time, arrived at by firing a rule and adding
its consequent as a new belief. A model M is a structure 〈S, T, V 〉 where S is a set of states; T ⊆ S × S
is a transition relation on states; and V : S −→ 2L is the labelling function, assigning a set of sentences of
the agent’s internal language to each state. Where there is a transition from s to s′, s′ will be said to be a
successor of s; s′ is reachable from s when there is a sequence of states ss1s2 · · · sns′ such that each is the
successor of the one before.
Definition 1 (Labelling) Given a model M = 〈S, T, V 〉, a sentence α ∈ L is said to label a state s ∈ S
when α ∈ V (s). Given models M = 〈S, T, V 〉 and M ′ = 〈S′, T ′, V ′〉 (which need not be distinct), states
s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′ are said to be label identical, written s  L s′, when V (s) = V ′(s′).
The definition of a formula φ of ML being true, or satisfied, by state s in a model M (written M, s  φ) is
as follows:
M, s  Bα iff α ∈ V (s)
M, s  ¬φ iff M, s 6 φ
M, s  φ1 ∧ φ2 iff M, s  φ1 and M, s  φ2
M, s  φ1 ∨ φ2 iff M, s  φ1 or M, s  φ2
M, s  φ1 → φ2 iff M, s 6 φ1 or M, s  φ2
M, s  3φ iff there exists a state s′ ∈ S such that Tss′ and M, s′  φ
Such models are known as Kripke models. ‘M, s  φ’ is read as s supports the truth of φ in M , or s
supports φ for short (if it is clear which model is being talked about). The definitions of global satisfiability
and validity are standard, and these notion extend to sets for formulae in the usual way. States s, s′ ∈ S are
said to be modally equivalent in M , written s! s′, when {φ |M, s  φ} = {ψ |M, s′  ψ}.
Because these models are common to modal logics in general, they need to be restricted in certain ways
to model rule-based agents. In particular, the rules which an agent believes do not change; rules are neither
learnt nor forgot. This is standard practise in rule-based AI systems (cf condition S4 below). Secondly, T
must relate states s and u when some rule ρ can be fired at s, and u is just like s except the agent has gained
one new belief, the consequent of ρ. Here, ρ is said to be an s-matching rule.
Definition 2 (Matching rule) Let ρ be a rule of the form λ1, . . . , λn ⇒ λ. ρ is then said to be s-matching,
for some state s ∈ S, iff ρ ∈ V (s), each λ1, . . . , λn ∈ V (s) but λ 6∈ V (s).
Whenever ρ is s-matching for some state s, then the agent can move into a new state u in which it has
gained a new belief. u is said to extend s by that new belief, namely cn(ρ).
Definition 3 (Extension of a state) For any rule ρ and states s, u ∈ S, u extends s by cn(ρ) iff V (u) =
V (s) ∪ { cn(ρ)}.
If there are no matching rules at a state (and so no rule instances to fire), that state is a terminating
state and has a transition to itself (or to another identical state, which amounts to much the same in modal
logic). This ensures that every state has an outgoing transition; in other words, T is a serial relation. As a
consequence, the question ‘what will the agent be doing after n cycles?’ may always be answered, even if
the agent ran out of rules to fire in less than n cycles.
Definition 4 (Terminating state) A state s is said to be a terminating state in a model M iff no rule ρ is
s-matching.
Transitions relate terminating states to identically labelled terminating states and, whenever there is a match-
ing rule ρ at a state s, a transition should only be possible to a state u which extends s by cn(ρ). We capture
such transition systems in the class S (for single agent models).
Definition 5 The class S contains precisely those models M which satisfy the following:
S1 for all states s ∈ S, if a rule λ1, . . . , λn ⇒ λ is s-matching, then there is a state s′ ∈ S such that Tss′
and s′ extends s by λ.
S2 for any terminating state s ∈ S, there exists a state s′ ∈ S such that V (s′) = V (s) and Tss′
S3 for all states s, s′ ∈ S, Tss′ only if either (i) there is an s-matching rule λ1, . . . , λn ⇒ λ and s′ extends
s by λ; or (ii) s is a terminating state and V (s) = V (s′).
S4 for all rules ρ and states s, u ∈ S, ρ ∈ V (s) iff ρ ∈ V (u).
It is clear that this definition ensures that T is a serial relation for any model M ∈ S. For any state s ∈ S,
either there is at least one matching rule or there is not. In the former case, S1 ensures that s is related to
some extension of itself by T ; otherwise, s is a terminating state and is related to an identically labelled
state by T .
There may, of course, be many matching rules at a given state, and for each there must be a state u such
that Tsu. Each transition may be thought of as corresponding to the agent’s nondeterministic choice to fire
one of these rule instances. ‘3φ’ may then be read as ‘after some such choice, φ will hold.’ We can think of
the agent’s reasoning as a cycle: (i) match rules against literals; (ii) choose one matching rule; (iii) add the
consequent of that rule to the set of beliefs; repeat. By chaining diamonds (or boxes), e.g. ‘333’ we can
express what properties can (and what will) hold after so many such cycles. We can abbreviate sequences of
n diamonds (or n boxes) as 3n and 2n respectively. ‘2nφ’, for example, may be read as ‘φ is guaranteed
to hold after n cycles.’ Note that the agent’s set of beliefs grows monotonically state by state and that the
agent never revises its beliefs, even if they are internally inconsistent.
Example
Before investigating the properties that models in the class S have, an example may help to illustrate the
concepts that have been introduced. Typically, the rules in rule-based programs will contain variables which
are matched against the contents of the agent’s working memory to produce instances of the rule. In this
example, the agent’s program contains just two rules:
R1 PremiumCustomer(x), Product(y)⇒ Discount(x, y, 10%)
R2 Spending(x,>1000)⇒ PremiumCustomer(x)
However, a first-order language is not needed to model this agent. Instead, we can consider the language
that contains all instances of the rules and all ground literals that appear in these instances.8
Now suppose that the agent’s initial working memory contains the beliefs
Product(iBook) Spending(Jones, >1000) Product(Sunglasses)
When the agent begins executing, R2 can be matched against Jones to produce
Spending(Jones, >1000)⇒ PremiumCustomer(Jones) (1)
8When considering a program R (section 4) or the axiomatization given in section 5, we must also assume that the set of constants
used to instantiate the variables in rules is finite.
Since no other instances of either R1 or R2 are possible, there is then a unique next state in which
PremiumCustomer(Jones)
is added to the agent’s working memory. At the agent’s next cycle, R1 can be matched against Jones and
either Sunglasses or iBook to produce the instances
PremiumCustomer(Jones), Product(Sunglasses)⇒ Discount(Jones, Sunglasses, 10%) (2)
PremiumCustomer(Jones), Product(iBook)⇒ Discount(Jones, iBook, 10%) (3)
Note that (1) is no longer counted as a matching rule instance, since its consequent has already been added
to the working memory. The agent can then move into a state in which the working memory contains
either Discount(Jones, Sunglasses, 10%) or else contains Discount(Jones, iBook, 10%) in addition
to its previous contents. If the agent fires (2), adding Discount(Jones, Sunglasses,10%) to working
memory, (3) remains a matching rule instance and Discount(Jones, iBook, 10%) is added at the next
state. Similarly, if the agents fires (3), adding Product(iBook)⇒ Discount(Jones, iBook, 10%), then
(2) remains matching. There is then a next state adding Discount(Jones, Sunglasses, 10%) to working
memory. Figure 1 shows a branching time model in which new beliefs are added to the working memory
(only new beliefs are shown). The agent can derive Discount(Jones , iBook , 10%) in 2 cycles, whereas it
must derive it in 3 cycles. If this model isM and its root s, thenM, s  33Discount(Jones, iBook, 10%)
and M, s  222Discount(Jones, iBook, 10%).
{
Product(iBook), Spending(Jones, 0), Product(Sunglasses)
}
PremiumCustomer(Jones)
Discount(Jones, iBook, 10%) Discount(Jones, Sunglasses, 10%)
Discount(Jones, Sunglasses, 10%) Discount(Jones, iBook, 10%)
Figure 1: New literals added to WM
3 Properties of Models
Now we need to know, how well do these models capture a rule-based agent’s reasoning process? Below I
give a number of simple yet powerful results. Firstly, there is a strong relationship between the way states
are labelled, the modal formulae which hold at those states and bisimulation. Secondly, models have a belief
convergence property. The remainder of section is fairly technical.
When a bisimulation relation Z holds between states s, s′, we write s ⋍ s′.9 Intuitively, all bisimilar
models describe the same reasoning process. It is sometimes convenient to work with models in which the
transition relation T forms a tree on the states S. Such models are known as tree models.
Proposition 1 Some standard properties of models M = 〈S, T, V 〉 and M ′ = 〈S′, T ′, V ′〉:
a. For all s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′, s ⋍ s′ implies s! s′. [8, p.67]
b. Every model M has a bisimilar tree model (obtained by unravelling M ).
c. Any satisfiable formula φ of depth d is satisfiable in a tree model of height no greater than d.
9See, for example, [8] for an explanation of bisimulation.
d. (Hennessy-Milner Theorem) If M and M ′ are image finite,10 then, s ! s′ implies s ⋍ s′ for all
s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S. [8, p.69]
These are standard properties of all Kripke models. From (a) and (b), whenever we are working with a
model M , we can always switch to a tree model M ′ which satisfies the same formulae (if M, s  φ, then
there is a state s′ ∈ M ′ : M ′, s′  φ.) The converse to (b) does not hold in general.11 (c) gives a restricted
version of the converse to (b). I now list a few properties which models M ∈ S in particular possess (I
don’t give a proof here as each proof is more or less immediate).
Proposition 2 (Properties of S Models) Assume that a model M = 〈S, V, T 〉 is a tree model with root r.
Then:
a. For all states s, s′ of depth n, |V (s)| = |V (s′)|. If V (r) is finite and s, s′ are not terminating states,
then |V (s)| = n+ |V (r)|.
b. If V (r) is finite, then V (s) is finite for all s ∈ S.
c. If s  L s′ and s, s′ are not terminating states, then s and s′ are of the same depth.
d. All siblings of terminating nodes are also terminating nodes.
e. If two children s1 and s2 of s are such that V (s1) − {λ1} = V (s2) − {λ2} then each has a child s′
such that V (s′) = V (s) ∪ {λ1, λ2}.
Lemma 1 For tree models M,M ′ ∈ S and states s in M , s′ in M ′: if s  L s′ and Tsu, then there is a
u′ ∈ S′ such that Ts′u′ and u  L u′.
Proof: If s is a terminating state then this is trivial; so assume that this is not the case. Then there is an
s-matching rule ρ such that V (u) = V (s){ cn(ρ)}. Since s  L s′, ρ is also s′-matching, hence there is a
u′ such that Ts′u′ and V (u′) = V (s′) ∪ { cn(ρ)}; hence u  L u′. ⊣
Theorem 1 For any models M,M ′ ∈ S and all states s in M and s′ in M ′: s  L s′ iff s! s′.
Proof: Clearly, s! s′ implies s  L s′. The converse: M, s  φ iff M ′, s′  φ, whenever s  L s′, is
shown by induction on the complexity of φ. The base case is trivial so assume thatM, v  ψ iffM ′, v′  ψ
for all v ∈ S, v′ ∈ S′ and ψ of lower complexity than φ whenever v  L v′. The cases for Booleans are
also trivial, so consider φ := 3ψ. Then s  L s′ and M, s  3ψ implies that there is a state u ∈ S such
that Tsu and M,u  ψ. By lemma 1, there is a state u′ ∈ S′ such that Ts′u′ u′  L s′. By hypothesis,
M ′, u′  ψ and hence M ′, s′  3φ. The converse holds by a similar argument, hence s! s′. ⊣
Theorem 2 For any models M,M ′ ∈ S and all states s in M and s′ in M ′: s! s′ iff s ⋍ s′.
Proof: From proposition 1(a), s ⋍ s′ implies s! s′, so it only remains to show the converse. Assume
s! s′ and that there is a u ∈ S such that Tsu; we must show that there is a state u′ ∈ S′ such that T ′s′u′
and u! u′. If s is a terminating state, this is trivial; so assume that s is non-terminating. There must be
an s-matching rule ρ. Since s′  L s, ρ must also be s′-matching and so, by S1, there is a state u′ ∈ S′
such that T ′s′u′ extending s′ by cn(ρ). Hence u′  L s′ and so, by theorem 1, u′! s′. ⊣
Corollary 1 Let M = 〈S, T, V 〉 ∈ S. For any s, s′ ∈ S and any descendant u of s, if s  L s′ then there
is a descendant u′ of u such that u  L u′.
Proof: The proof is immediate from theorem 2. ⊣
We can thus partition states into equivalence classes (s, s′ ∈ [s] whenever s  L s′) and transform any
model M into a bisimular model M≡ just by comparing the labels on states in M . The domain of M≡
is the set of label equivalence classes in M such that T≡[s][u] whenever Tsu and V ≡([s]) = V (s) for
some s ∈ [s]. Any formula satisfiable in M is then satisfiable in M≡, and M≡ has the handy property that
[s]  L [u] implies [s] = [u].
10A model is image finite iff
S
s∈S{u | Tsu} is finite.
11Given a model M , we can construct a modally equivalent model N containing an infinite branch for which there can be no
bisimulation Z : M ⋍ N (if we suppose there is, we will eventually come to a point on the infinite branch in N for which the
corresponding point in M has no successor; hence they cannot be bisimilar states).
Definition 6 Let M = 〈S, T, V 〉 ∈ S and n ∈ N. Define T nsu to hold iff there are states s0 · · · sn such
that s = s0, u = sn and, for each i < n, Tsnsn+1.
Now we show that models in S have the property of belief convergence.
Theorem 3 (Belief Convergence) For any model M = 〈S, T, V 〉 ∈ S, any state r ∈ S and any n ∈ N, if
T nrs and T nru, then there is a state s′ reachable from s and u′ reachable from u such that s′  L u′.
Proof: Without loss of generality, consider a tree modelM ∈ S whose root is r. Let s, u both be reachable
from r in a finite number of transitions. Then there are equinumerous setsX,Y such that V (s) = V (r)∪X
and V (u) = V (r)∪Y . Now consider the subbranch from r to s: for each transition Tvv′ on the branch, pick
a v-matching rule ρ such that v′ extends v by cn(ρ). Enumerate the selected rules ρ for which cn(ρ) /∈ V (u)
as ρ1, . . . , ρn (from r to s). It is easy to see that there must be a state u′ reachable from u, on the branch
that results from firing first ρ1 and then . . . and then ρn. Thus V (u′) = V (u) ∪ { cn(ρ1), . . . , cn(ρn)} =
V (u) ∪X ′ = V (u) ∪X = V (r) ∪ Y ∪X . By similar reasoning, there must be a state s′ reachable from s
with V (s′) = V (s) ∪ Y = V (r) ∪X ∪ Y . Hence, s′  L u′. ⊣
4 Finite Models and Programs
Because of our motivating interest in resource boundedness, we will sometimes want to restrict ourselves
to models in which each state is labelled by only finitely many L-formulae, for these are the sentences
representing the agent’s basic explicit beliefs, of which any real agent may have only finitely many at any
one time. We capture this intuition in the class of finite memory models.
Definition 7 (Finite memory model) A model M ∈ S is a finite memory model iff V (s) is finite for each
s ∈ S. Cfm is the set of all finite memory models in some class C.
An interesting feature of finite memory models in S is that each is bisimilar to a finite state model in S. This
is the finite model property:
Theorem 4 (Finite Model Property) For any finite memory model M = 〈S, T, V 〉 ∈ Sfm, there is a
model M ′ containing only finitely many states and a bisimulation Z :M ⋍M ′.
Proof: For any state s ∈ S, if V (s) is finite, s may only have finitely many children, each of which
are labelled by only finitely many formulae. Let R be the set of rules which label each state (by S4, all
states are labelled by precisely the same rules); clearly R is finite. Then any state s ∈ S can have at
most |{ cn(ρ) | ρ ∈ R}| matching rules. Thus a finite memory model with infinitely many states must
have an infinite branch, on which only a finite initial segment is generated by matching rules, i.e. only
the first n states on the branch are non-terminating states, for some n ≤ |{ cn(ρ) | ρ ∈ R}|. By S3ii,
s  L s′ whenever Tss′ and s, s′ are terminating states. A model M ′ can be obtained by selecting the first
terminating state s on each branch inM , removing all the descendants of s and adding a transition Tss. M ′
satisfies S2 and is clearly bisimilar to M . Moreover, since s occurred on a finite initial segment of a branch
in M , M ′ only contains branches of finite length. It follows that M ′ only contains finitely many states. ⊣
The above has been a general characterisation of rule-based agents which execute fixed but unspecified
set of rules. However, we are often interested in restricting our attention to agents reasoning with a specific
set of rules. Following the usual terminology, a program is simply a finite set of rules. One of the uses of
the current approach is testing for properties of particular programs.12 Given a programR for the agent, we
can define a subclass SR as containing just those models in S in which the agent believes all the rules in R
and no further rules.
Definition 8 (The class SR) Let R be a program (i.e. a finite set of rules). A model M = 〈S, T, V 〉 ∈ SR
iff M ∈ S and, for all states s ∈ S,R ⊆ V (s). An L-formula φ is said to be SR-satisfiable iff it is satisfied
at some state s in some model M ∈ SR.
12In [24] I discuss adding additional temporal operators and path quantifiers from computational tree logic (CTL), a common input
language for model checking technology. This extension allows rule-based programmers to use current model checking technology to
verify their programs.
Each class SR is a subclass of S and each model in S is in exactly one class SR. S and its subclasses differ
with respect to (semantic) entailment and satisfiability. If R = {p ⇒ q}, then Bp ∧ ¬3Bq is S-satisfiable
but not SR-satisfiable; similarly, 3Bq is a SR-consequence but not a S-consequence of Bp. The remainder
of this section surveys some properties of the class SR, including a decidability result.
Theorem 5 Let R be a program, φ be anyML formula and n = |{ cn(ρ) | ρ ∈ R}|. If φ is SR-satisfiable
at all, then it is satisfiable in a finite model M ∈ SR containing at most nn states.
Proof: Suppose φ is satisfiable at s in a model in SR; then it is satisfied by a tree model M ∈ SR whose
root is s (proposition 1). By S3, any state u in M can have at most |R| children. Now, take any state s
in M of depth n. No ρ ∈ R can be s-matching, for otherwise, some ancestor of s must have extended its
parent by some λ /∈ { cn(ρ) | ρ ∈ R}; but S3 prohibits this. Then any state at depth n or greater must be a
terminating state. There is then a modelM ′ ∈ SR forming a rooted directed acyclic graph, bisimilar to M ,
in which s  L u implies s = u (e.g. by taking equivalence classes from M , as described above). For any
state s in M ′, |{s′ | Tss′}| ≤ n and, for states u, u′ at depth n or greater, T ′uu′ implies u = u′. Therefore
M ′ can contain at most nn states. ⊣
In any state in a modelM ∈ SR, only the labels in the setsR and {λ1, . . . , λn, λ | (λ1, . . . , λn ⇒ λ) ∈ R}
can have any effect on which rules do and do not match at that state. Thus, it is only these formulae that
affect the structure that T forms on S. Labels that are not from these sets may be removed without changing
which states are accessible from which in the model. We can combine this with standard techniques to get
a notion of filtration for SR models.
Definition 9 (R-filtration) Let Γ be closed under both subformulae and negation; and set
LΓ = R∪ {α | Bα ∈ Γ} ∪ {λ1, . . . , λn, λ | (λ1, . . . , λn ⇒ λ) ∈ R}
An R-filtration of M = 〈S, T, V 〉 through Γ is then a model MΓ = 〈S, T, VΓ〉 where VΓ(s) = V (s) ∩ LΓ.
Filtration here is rather different than in regular modal logic. Here, we must ensure that rules and the beliefs
needed for them to match are not removed from states when we filter, hence the use of LΓ.
Lemma 2 Let Γ be as above, M = 〈S, T, V 〉 ∈ SR and MΓ be the R-filtration of M through Γ. Then for
any φ ∈ Γ and s ∈ S: M, s  φ iff MΓ, s  φ.
Proof: By induction on the complexity of φ. If φ is an ML primitive this is trivial. So assume that, for
all ψ ∈ Γ of complexity k < n and any state s ∈ S: M, s  ψ iff ML, s  ψ. We show this holds for all
φ ∈ Γ of complexity n. The only if direction is trivial; in the if direction, consider these cases:
φ := ¬ψ. Then M, s 1 ψ and, by hypothesis,MΓ, s 1 ψ, hence MΓ, s  φ.
φ := ψ1 ∧ ψ2. Then M, s  ψ1 and M, s  ψ2. By hypothesis, MΓ, s  ψ1 and MΓ, s  ψ2, hence
MΓ, s  φ.
φ := 3ψ. Then there is a s′ ∈ S such that M, s′  ψ and Tss′. By hypothesis, MΓ, s′  ψ and
hence MΓ, s  φ.
The other Boolean cases are similar; it follows that MΓ, s  φ. ⊣
Lemma 3 Let Γ be as above, M ∈ SR and MΓ be the R-filtration of M through Γ. Then MΓ ∈ SR.
Proof: It follows from lemma 2 that any rule ρ is s-matching in M iff it is s-matching in MΓ and that
ρ ∈ VΓ(s) iff ρ ∈ V (s). Since T is common to both M and MΓ, S1-4 are satisfied and hence MΓ ∈ SR.⊣
Definition 10 Let sub(φ) be the set of subformulae of φ, i.e.:
sub(Bα) = {Bα}
sub(¬φ) = sub(3φ) = sub(φ)
sub(φ ∧ ψ) = sub(φ ∨ ψ) = sub(φ→ ψ) = sub(φ) ∪ sub(ψ)
and let Cl(φ) be sub(φ) closed under negation.
Theorem 6 (Finite Memory Property) Let R be a program and φ be any ML formula. If φ is R-
satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in a finite memory model M ∈ SfmR .
Proof: Assume that M, s satisfies φ. Let MΓ be the R-filtration of M through Γ = Cl(φ). By lemma 2,
MΓ, s  φ and, by lemma 3, MΓ ∈ SR. Since Cl (φ) and R are both finite, V (s) is finite for every s ∈ S,
hence MΓ ∈ SfmR . ⊣
Theorem 7 (Decidability) Let R be a program and φ be any ML formula. Then it is decidable whether
φ is SR-satisfiable.
Proof: Suppose φ is R-satisfiable; then it is satisfied at the root r of some tree model M ∈ SR. Let MΓ
be theR-filtration of M through Γ = Cl(φ). By inspecting the proof of theorem 6, MΓ, r  φ, MΓ ∈ SfmR
and VΓ(r) = V (s) ∩ LΓ, with LΓ as definition 9. Let n = |{ cn(ρ) | ρ ∈ R}|. By inspecting the proof of
theorem 5, a model M ′Γ can be obtained that has at most nn states (e.g. by taking equivalence classes from
MΓ, as described above). Thus if φ has an S-model, one can be found by considering each model with no
more then nn states whose root is labelled by a subse t of LΓ. Since LΓ is bounded by the size of φ and R,
we have an upper bound on the search for a model. We therefore have a terminating algorithm that will find
an SR model for φ if one exists. ⊣
5 Axiomatization and Complexity
Given some such programR, it is easy to axiomatize the logic of the class SR. The abbreviation
match(λ1, . . . , λn ⇒ λ)
df
= Bλ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bλn ∧ ¬Bλ
is helpful. The axiom system shown in figure 2 is called ΛR. A6 says that, when a belief is added, it must
have been is added by some matching rule instance in R. A7 says that, if all matching rule instances in the
current state are ρ1, . . . , ρn, then each of the successor states should contain the consequent of one of those
instances.
Cl all classical propositional tautologies
K 2(φ→ ψ) → (2φ→ 2ψ)
A1 Bρ where ρ ∈ R
A2 ¬Bρ where ρ 6∈ R
A3 Bα→ 2Bα
A4 B(λ1, . . . , λn ⇒ λ) ∧ Bλ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bλn ⇒ 3Bλ
A5 3(Bα ∧ Bβ) → Bα ∨ Bβ
A6 3Bα→ (Bα ∨
_
λ1,...,λn⇒λ∈R,λ=α
Bλ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bλn)
A7 matchρ1 ∧ · · · ∧matchρn ∧
^
ρ 6=ρi≤n,ρ∈R
¬matchρ→ 2
“
Bcn(ρ1) ∨ · · · ∨ Bcn(ρn)
”
n > 1
A8 3⊤
MP φ φ→ ψ
ψ
N φ
2φ
Figure 2: Axiom schemes for ΛR
A derivation in ΛR is defined in a standard way, relative to R: φ is derivable from a set of formulae
Γ (written Γ ⊢R φ) iff there is a sequence of formulae φ1, . . . , φn where φn = φ and each φi is either an
instance of an axiom schema, or a member of Γ, or is obtained from the preceding formulae by MP or N.
Suppose an agent’s program R contains the rules ρ1, . . . , ρn. This agent is guaranteed to reach a state in
which it believes α in k steps, starting from a state where it believes λ1, . . . , λm, iff
Bρ1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bρn ∧ Bλ1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bλm ⇒ 2
k
Bα
is derivable in ΛR (again, 2kα is an abbreviation for 22 · · ·2α, k times). We now show that ΛR is the
logic of the class SR (the proofs of lemmas 4 and 5 are standard).
Lemma 4 (Lindenbaum lemma) Any set of formulae Γ can be expanded to a ΛR-maximal consistent set
Γ+.
A canonical model MR = 〈S, T, V 〉 is built in the usual way. States in S are ΛR-maximal consistent sets;
Tsu iff {φ | 2φ ∈ s} ⊆ u (or equivalently, iff {3φ | φ ∈ u} ⊆ s). Finally, V (s) = {α ∈ L | Bα ∈ s}, for
each s ∈ S.
Lemma 5 (Existence and Truth lemma) For any φ and any state s in MR: (i) if there is a formula 3φ ∈
s then there is a state u in MR such that Tsu and φ ∈ u; and (ii) MR, s  φ iff φ ∈ s.
Lemma 6 Let MR be a canonical model and let α ∈ L and s, u ∈ S. Then (i) if Tsu and α ∈ V (u) but
α /∈ V (s), then V (u) = V (s) ∪ {α}; and (ii) α in part (i) must be a literal.
Proof: Part (i) follows from the definition of ‘’ together with the truth lemma and the fact that states are
closed under axioms A3 and A5. The former axiom ensures that s is a subset of u, the latter ensures that α
is the only new belief. For part (ii), if we suppose α were some rule we would have α ∈ R and so α ∈ s,
contrary to hypothesis. ⊣
Theorem 8 (Completeness) ΛR is strongly complete with respect to the class SR: given a program R, a
set of ML-formulae Γ and an ML-formula φ, Γ R φ only if Γ ⊢R φ.
Proof: Expand Γ to a ΛR-maximal consistent set Γ+ from which we build a canonical model MR. From
the truth lemma, it follows that MR,Γ+  Γ. It remains only to show that MR is in the class SR, i.e. that
MR satisfies S1–S4. S4 is clearly satisfied; the remaining cases are:
MR satisfies S1: Assume there is an s-matching rule ρ. Given the truth lemma, it is easy to see that each
of its antecedents is a member of s, whereas its consequent is not. A4 and the existence lemma guarantee
an accessible state u which, given lemma 6, is the extension of s by cn(ρ).
MR satisfies S2: Suppose s is a terminating state. By axiom A8, there is an accessible state s′. By axiom
A6, α ∈ V (s′) implies α ∈ V (s) for any literal α (this holds because there are no matching rules at s). It
then follows from axioms A1–A3 that V (s′) = V (s), hence S2 is satisfied.
MR satisfies S3: Suppose Tsu for states s, u in MR. By definition, {φ | 2φ ∈ s} ⊆ u. By axiom A7,
there must be one literal believed in u but not in s, namely the consequent of either ρ1 or . . . or ρn. Then
by the argument just used, it follows that u is the extension of s by this new belief. ⊣
Theorem 9 Given a particular programR, the problem of deciding whether a formula φ is satisfiable in a
model M ∈ SR is NP-complete.
Proof: Clearly the problem is NP-hard. Let n = |{ cn(ρ) | ρ ∈ R}|. From theorem 5, any SR-satisfiable
sentence φ has a tree model M ∈ SR containing no more than nn states which, given the proof of theorem
6, is no larger than |φ|nn. Given any Kripke structure M ′, state s in M ′ and a modal formula ψ, it takes
time polynomial in the size of M ′ and ψ to check whether M ′, s  ψ [8]. The crucial point here is that
|R|, and hence nn, is constant in SR. Thus, we can guess a model M ∈ SR of size no greater than |φ|nn
and check whether φ is satisfied at the root of M in time polynomial in |φ|. It follows that the problem of
deciding whether φ is SR-satisfiable is in NP. ⊣
One of the main practical uses of models in a class SR is to check whetherR satisfies certain properties,
specified as an input formula φ. One may want to check a range of different programs against a different
property: for example, suppose a developer requires an agent which can never move into a state in which
φ holds. On discovering that φ is SR1-satisfiable, she must reject R1. If R2 is the next generation of
the program, then φ needs to be checked for SR2 -satisfiability. The evolution from R1 to R2 may have
added a large number of rules to the program. This example highlights that it is not just the scalability of
satisfiability checking given φ as an input that should concern us. How the problem scales with the size of
the agent’s program is also crucial.13 An interesting problem to consider, therefore, is the one that takes
both a formula φ and a program R as its input and determines whether φ is SR satisfiable. I call this the
S-SAT problem. The complexity of the problem should be investigated in terms of |R| and |φ| rather than
in terms of |φ| alone.
Theorem 10 S-SAT is in PSPACE.
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof that the K-satisfiability problem has a PSPACE-implementation
in [8]. An S-Hintikka set over a program R and a set Σ is like a standard Hintikka set but, in addition,
contains all instances of axiom schemes A1–A8 over Σ. A witness set is then defined as in [8]. The key
result is that a S-Hintikka set H over R and Σ is SR-satisfiable iff there is a witness set generated by H
overR and Σ. A formula φ can then be tested for satisfiability by setting Σ = Cl(φ)∪ {Bα | α ∈ Cl(R)}.
A correct algorithm called witness can then be given which returns true on input H,R,Σ iff H is a SR-
satisfiable S-Hintikka set over R and Σ. The final stage establishes that witness has an implementation on
a non-deterministic Turing machine that only requires space polynomial in |φ| and |R|. Since NPSPACE =
PSPACE, this establishes that S-SAT is in PSPACE. The full proof is given in [24]. ⊣
6 Related Work
Early work in epistemic logic on rule-based system, influenced by work in AI, is found in Konolige’s
Deduction Model of Belief [25]. As here, semantics is given in terms of sets of formulae, with Biα true iff
agent i has α in its belief set. Each agent i is assigned a set of deduction rules ρi, which need not be logically
complete (and in fact must not be to avoid closure of belief under classical consequence). A belief set is
then obtained by closing an agent’s knowledge base under its rules. This is what [13] term a “final tray”
model of belief (p. 1), reporting what an agent would derive, given unlimited time and memory. Agents
with a functionally complete set of deduction rules are therefore modelled as believing all tautologies and
all consequences of their beliefs and so logical omniscience is only avoided by considering agents with
depleted logical ability.
In [22, 23], Ho Ngoc Duc presents an epistemic logic based on dynamic logic. If r is an inference
rule that the agent can use, then 〈r〉 is the usual dynamic modality ‘after executing (i.e. reasoning using)
r, it is possible that . . . ’ where the blank will usually be filled with a belief ascription. Ho introduces a
future modality 〈F 〉, defined as the iterated set of all choices of actions r1, . . . , rn available to the agent:
F = (r1 ∪ · · · ∪ rn)
∗
. 〈F 〉Bφ then says that the agent can come to believe that φ and [F ]Bφ says that the
agent must believe that φ at some point in the future. The notion of the future here is thus an idealised one,
considering all the states in a temporally unbounded reasoning process. For example, if p is a propositional
(modality-free) tautology, then 〈F 〉Bp is a theorem. It is not even correct to read 〈F 〉Bp as ‘the agent can
believe p at some point in the (idealised) future’ (just consider a tautology p so large that no agent could
come to hold the sentence in its memory). The 〈F 〉 operator thus ignores resource bounds.
This highlights an important point. Avoiding logical omniscience is not an end in itself. Evidently,
what is therefore required is a logic which not only avoids logical omniscience, but that captures the stages
of reasoning are captured, rather than just the idealised endpoint. Step logic [13] attempts to overcome
this problem by indexing beliefs by time points or steps. Each step corresponds to a cycle in the agent’s
reasoning. Step logic deduction rules take the form:
t: α1 · · · αn
t+ 1: α
13In fact, this can often be the more important factor of the two, for the size of many programs currently in use far exceeds the size
of the formulae that it is useful to check for satisfiability.
However, a semantics is not provided for any step logic in [13]. A minimal possible worlds semantics for
step logic are found in [29] and [12]. Belief is defined as a relation between a world and a set of sets of
worlds, based on Scott-Montague (or neighbourhood/minimal) structures; an axiomatization is found in
[29]. However, agents are modelled as believing all propositional tautologies and their beliefs as closed
under equivalence. This is a limitation of Scott-Montague semantics, which deals with the intensions of
believed sentences (equivalent sentences necessarily have identical intensions). Grant, Kraus and Perlis
provide a first-order axiomatization and model theory for step logic in [20]. Not all of the models they
describe are adequate representations of an agent’s beliefs, in that a particular model may contain ‘extra’
sentences not derivable from the agent’s previous beliefs. Accordingly, they introduce the notion of knowl-
edge supported models. This suggests that the framework is not ideally suited to modelling belief obtained
by rule-based reasoning.
Timed Reasoning Logic (TRL) is introduced in [5, 6]. The focus is on modelling different rule applica-
tion and conflict resolution strategies in rule-based systems, building on the step logic approach. Semantics
are provided in terms of syntactic local models. TRL uses labelled formulae rather than the modal met-
alanguage adopted here. In [36], TRL is used to model assumption-based reasoning in resource-bounded
agents. Such ways of reasoning cannot be modelled by step logic, in which implications must be deal with
by forming instances of Hilbert axioms. One major difference between TRL and the present approach is
that an agent’s current state together with its rules determines a unique next state. It is thus not possible
to distinguish between the beliefs that an agent can derive from those it must derive in a certain number of
steps. This is a limitation of TRL (and step logic) that has been addressed int he present work.
A˚gotnes [1] considers a logic of finite syntactic epistemic states. As with TRL and the Deduction Model,
the semantics is based on sets of sentences. An unusual feature of [1] is that syntactic operators take sets
of sentences as their arguments. △i{φ1, . . . , φn} says that agent i believes at least that φ1, . . . , φn are true.
Similarly,▽i{φ1, . . . , φn} says that agent i believes at the most that φ1, . . . , φn are true. The syntax of what
an agent believes at a time thus closely follows the semantics. A semantics is provided by game-theoretic
structures, allowing expressive ATL modalities to be incorporated in the logic. Given a set of agents G,
the path quantifier 〈〈G〉〉 allows sentences to express co-operation between members of G to achieve some
result. This approach forms the basis of [3] and [2].
7 Future Work
This paper has presented a basic framework for modelling rule-based agents in a simplified, monotonic
setting. One of the principal applications of the logic that has been developed is to verify that a rule-based
program satisfies certain criteria. To this end, the addition of computational tree logic (CTL) modalities
would constitute an increase in expressivity and allow the resulting language to be used as an input to
model checkers. Note that the 3 modality discussed here corresponds to the CTL modality EX (EXφ
holds iff φ holds at the next step of some branch). This is a minor amendment to the syntax; the models
themselves remain identical. The aim in this paper was explicitly to restrict attention to a single rule-based
agent. As with most modal logics, it is surprisingly easy to add multiple agents to the formalism (add a
valuation Vi for each agent i and plausible rules about communication between agents); see [4].
A more challenging development would be to drop the monotonicity requirement. Nonmonotonic rea-
soning is important in many areas of AI: see [19]. In fact, a good deal of practical reasoning is nonmono-
tonic. Makinson comments that “almost all of our everyday reasoning is nonmonotonic; purely deductive,
monotonic inference takes place only in rather special contexts, notably pure mathematics” [28, p. 19].
Nonmonotonic reasoning in rule-based systems can arise in a number of ways. One is when certain condi-
tions determine which rule should be fired in the next cycle. Situations can arise in which ρ may fire but,
if the agent were to know more information, ρ would not be fired. The resulting consequence relation is
nonmonotonic.
Another route to nonmonotonicity in rule-based systems is to consider rules of the form
P1, . . . , Pn ⇒ ∼Q
where ∼Q instructs the agent to remove Q from its working memory. Firing such a rule does not lead
to a new belief; but it can lead to the agent having one less belief. Amending the current framework to
allow for such nonmonotonic rule-based inference would increase its applicability in many areas of AI. A
starting point is to amend the requirement that one state extends another when there is a transition to the
first from the second. Instead, define an amend operation ‘◦’ on 2L × L such that X ◦ p = X ∪ {p} and
X ◦ ∼p = X − {p}. Then, whenever there is an s-matching rule ρ, there is a state u such that Tsu and u
amends s by cn(ρ). In this system, the order in which rules fire matters. Moreover, it is no longer the case
that if Γ entails φ then Γ ∪ {ψ} entails φ. It would be interesting to see which of the properties discussed
above hold of this logic; this is left for future work.
8 Summary
This paper presents a framework for modelling resource bounded reasoners that derive new beliefs from
old through inference. The approach is designed to handle inference rules of many types. The example of
rule-based programs was chosen here as it allows a simple testbed for the framework. The resulting models
of rule-based agents have a number of interesting properties: the equivalence between label identity, modal
equivalence and bisimulation, and the belief convergence property. When a particular program is specified,
a logic with a decidable satisfaction relation is obtained, which can be easily axiomatized. The interesting
satisfiability problem in the resulting logics is in PSPACE.
Not all reasoners are rule-based in the restricted sense used here. Many agents revise their beliefs (and
indeed their rules); conclusions can be withdrawn as well as asserted; agents reason inductively and abduc-
tively as well as deductively; agents make assumptions and see what follows. These forms of reasoning have
not been addressed here. Nevertheless, resource-bounded reasoners using any of these forms of reasoning
will amend their set of beliefs in a step-by-step way according to their chosen set of rules. By treating these
transitions from one belief state to the next as the foundation for a semantics, a fine-grained account of
resource-bounded reasoning is possible in which the problems of logical omniscience never arise.
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